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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
:\I Erl'ALS Ml\NUF ACTURING 
< i< L\l P ANY, a r:-tah corporation, 
PI a,i ntiff' a.·1ul .Appel! an f, 
-VR.-
IL\1\ 1\: OF CO~'ll\IERCE, 
a Utah corporation, 




NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment dismissing ap-
pellant's Complaint and holding that appellant was not 
entitled to recover for construction, addition to, altera-
tion, or repair to a building, structure, or improvement 
upon land under Utah Bond Statute 14-2-1 and 14-2-2. 
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
The case was submitted to the Court, sitting with-
out a jury. The trial court ruled that an aluminum rail-
1 
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ing made to order and fabricated for installation in a 
building at the instance and request of the defendant 
and affixed to the floor and walls of a building was per-
sonal property and was not an addition to, alteration, or 
repair of a building and structure within the meaning of 
Utah Code Annotated 14-2-1. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant seeks to reverse the decision of the court 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During May of 1963, Arnold Drews, of Modern Orna-
mental Iron Works, ordered three sections of aluminum 
railings and three gates from the appellant, fabricated 
to order, in accordance with plans and specifications, for 
installation in a building located in Magna, Utah, (R. 21, 
22, 23, 41) and leased by respondent for a commercial 
banking business. (R. 33) 
Appellant fabricated said railings and gates and de-
livered them to Arnold Drews. (R. 21, 22, 23) Drews in 
turn installed and affixed the railings and gates to the 
floors and walls in the bank building (R. 31, 32, 35, 41) 
leased by the respondent and was subsequently paid by 
the respondent bank in full (Dep., 5, 6), but thereafter 
refused to pay the appellant the agreed contractual price 
for the labor, materials and profit involved in the fabri-
cation of said railings and gates. (Dep. 6) 
There was no issue over the fact that the installa-
tion of the railings and gates was made on leased prem· 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ises. ( PrP-'Prin I ()rder) l r ndPr the terms of respondent's 
LPa~(', tltP rP~pondPnt lesseP agreed \\·ith lessor to make 
said impro\·ements to the building. (R. 38) (Plaintiff'~ 
~~xhibit 10) Accordingly, this case involves improve-
m£lnt ~ made to a leasehold interest and is within the Bond 
~tatutP 1-+-~-1. HPP Buehner Block C(nnpan.lJ v. Glezos. 6 
lTtah ~d 226,310 P. 2d 317 (1957). 
H(·~pondent bank did not secure from its contractor, 
.Arnold 11rl1 \VS, a Performance or Payment Bond as re-
quired h~· 1-!-2-1. (Pre-Trial Order) (Dep. 6).) After 
t hP railings and gates "·ere fabricated to order and in-
~talled, both Drews and the respondent bank refused to 
pay appellant (Dep. 6), and accordingly, appellant 
brought this action for payment of the reasonable Yalue 




THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GR~\NT RELIEF TO THE APPELLANT UN-
DER UTAH STATUTES 14-2-1 AND 14-2-2. 
l~tah Code Annotated 14-2-1 clearly states: 
~'The O\vner of any interest in land entering into 
a contract, involving $500.00 or more, for the con-
struction, addition to, or alteration. or repair of, 
any building, structure or inzprorenzent upon lanrl 
shall, before any such \vork is commenced, obtain 
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the 
contract price ... and any person "·ho has fur-
nished materials or performed labor for or upon 
any such building, structure or improvement, pay-
3 
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ment for \vhich has not been made, shall have a 
direct right of action against the sureties . . . '' 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Utah Code Annotated 14-2-2: 
''Any person subject to the provisions of this 
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and suf-
ficient bond . . . shall be personally liable to all 
persons who have furnished materials or per-
formed labor under the contract for the reason-
able value of such materials furnished or labor 
performed, not exceeding, however, in any case 
the prices agreed upon.'' 
Respondent did not secure a bond as required and 
no\v argues the Statute is inapplicable because it merely 
purchased an item of personal property. 
The railings and gates were made to order and fab-
ricated specifically to fit into this particular building and 
were affixed to both the walls and the floors of the build-
ing. Mr. Charles I. Canfield, on page 4 of his deposition, 
in answer to a question, stated: 
''So I asked him if he would have them come out 
and contact me relative to the construction and de-
livery of these railings. A l\Ir. Drews called on 
me and I told him what I wanted. He said he 
would take it and take the measurements, figure 
what he could do the job for, and would submit a 
bid. This he did, and I authorized him to go ahead 
and prepare the railings for us.'' (Emphasis 
supplied) 
This statement of fact by J\Ir. Canfield clearly sho\\TS 
that the railings and gates were an audition, alteration, 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or repair, to n building, structure, and improvement 
upon land. And then at page 9 of the deposition, in an-
s\\·Pr to a question by 1\Ir. Mecham, Mr. Canfield further 
stated: 
''.:\In. l\[Ec HAl\I: Did you prepare a scale 
dra,ving of this? 
''A. ) .. es. 
''MR. l\IECHAM : Where is the scale drawing~ 
"A. I don't where, Mr. Mecham. We have 
another one my boy made the other day, which 
would be just the same as this. It was just the 
layout, but I did put it to scale so I knew how much 
footage I needed for each. 
''MR. MECHAM : For each of the areas ? 
"A. Yes. 
''MR. MECHAM : You drew this, of course, to fit 
this particular building? 
''A. That is right, to fit the building. 
'' ~IR. MEcHAM: That is all.'' 
The special construction of the railings and gates 
sho,vs they were intended to constitute a part of the 
building. 
''The fact that the article was specially construct-
ed or fitted with a view to its location and use on 
the particular land or in the particular building, 
it being consequently less readily susceptible of 
use elsewhere, tends to show that it was intended 
to constitute a part of the land.'' Knoff Woodwork 
Company Y. Zotalis, 213 Minn. 204, 6 N.W. 2d 264, 
266 (1942). 
5 
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In addition, the desirability of the railing a~ a part 
of the finish of the building for the purpose for "·hich 
it is desired, indicates the railings and gates are a part 
of the land and, therefore, an improvement. See Neu· 
York Life Insurance Company v. Allison, 107 F. 179, 
46 C.C.A. 229 (1901), Cert. Denied 21 S. Ct. 923, 181 U.S. 
618; Southern California Telephone Company v. State 
Board of Education, 12 Cal. 2d 127, 82 P. 2d 422 (1938). 
And, on page 11 : 
'' 1\iR. MECHAl\1: How are the partitions fixed 
to the building~ 
''A. They were just nailed to the floor. All we 
have to do is to take one side out and t'vo nails 
right out. ' ' 
The fact that the railings and gates are removable 
without material injury to the freehold does not defeat 
the nature of the railing and gates as fixtures. C.J.S., 
Sec. 5, page 610. 
The Court, in Helms v. Gilroy, 20 Or. 517, 26 P. 851, 
853 ( 1891), held machinery was a part of the fixture. In 
a suit to foreclose a mortgage, the Court said: 
"It is true the scre,vs and bolts 'vith which it 'vas 
annexed could have been taken out, and the ma-
chinery removed, without serious damage to it or 
the building, but so, no doubt, could have been 
the doors and windows. It was, in its very nature, 
adapted to the business for which the land was 
used. The party making the annexation must 
have intended that it should remain as long as it 
continued serviceable .... '' 
6 
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In n~Jation to pPrmaneH<'y, it appears to be suffieient 
that thP railing i~ intended to remain 'vhere placed aR 
long as the building to ""hich it is annexed may he used 
for the snmP banking purpsP. See Trabue Pittn1a11 Corp., 
Lin1.ifcd v. Los .Llngeles Cou11fy, 29 Cal. 2d 385, 175 P. 
:!d :> 1 ~ ( 1946) . 
l\Ir. Canfield further recognized the fact that the 
railings "·ere in fact fixtures at page 14 of his deposi-
tion. In answer to a question, Mr. Canfield stated: 
'' Q. Did you contemplate the possibility of 
such a move when you planned the furniture and 
equipment in the Bank of Commerce~ 
''A. Not for ten years because our lease runs 
ten years. Unless some development came that 
\vould make it financially feasible to sub-lease 
these quarters and move some place else. 
''MR. l\IEcHAl\I: You provided that in your 
lease'? 
''.A... Yes. 
'' l\IR. MECHAM: So that any of these fixtures 
could be taken out~ 
"A. Yes, or moved to any place we want to at 
our convenience.'' 
.. :\.nd, on Page 16, ~Ir. Canfield stated: 
"Q. I call your attention to paragraph 10 of the 
lease, \vhich is on page 2. Did you have anything 
to do "ith the specific negotiation of this para-
graph in the lease~ 
' '.A.. Yes, I did. 
-
• 
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'' Q. 'Vill you explain that, please? 
''A. The original lease was drawn hy ~Ir. John 
Rokich and he sent the form over to me for my 
approval and also a copy to Mr. Paulos, I think 
~Ir. Ernest Paulos for his approval. 
''After I read it he had left out this provision 
relative to removing items that we would put in. 
Remodeling, changing the interior and so forth i~ 
outlined in this paragraph 10. That had been left 
out. 
''I sent the lease back to him and told him 
"·hat we wanted, we wanted that provision put in 
the lease. I also explained Mr. Paulos "·a~ agree-
able to it. 
"Mr. Rokich then rewrote the lease "'ith thi~ 
paragraph 10 in. 
"Q. Why did you want it in' 
''A. So we could remove these fixtures an<1 
. t " equ1pmen ... 
Under the ruling of the lower court, any railing or 
gate affixed to a structure and made to order which is 
an alteration, addition, or repair to an existing struc-
ture, but which could be unbolted and remoYed is not 
such an addition, alteration, or repair vvithin the meaning 
of Utah Code Annotated 14-2-1. Under the ruling of the 
lower court, it is apparent also that the plaintiff and ap-
pellant did not have a lien right to secure its payment for 
the fabrication and construction of the railing added 
to and secured to the said Bank building. The Supreme 
Court of Utah has on many occasions announced the 
fact that "the Statute of Utah no",. under revie\\. i~ 
8 
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anxilinry to our mechanie 's liPn la\\·, and just as much 
in aid of it as if it had been made part of it and incorpo-
rah-d in the same rhapter.'' Rio Grande Lu1nber Conl-
pany v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 124-, 167 P. 241 (1917). 
''The purpose of the Statute is to prevent owners 
of land from having their .lands improved \vith 
the materials and labor furnished and performed 
by third persons, and thus to enhance the value 
of such lands, without becoming personally re-
sponsible for the reasonable value of materials 
and labor which enhanced its value.'' Liberty Coal 
& I.Jumber Company v. Snow, 53 Utah 298, 178 P. 
341, 343 (1917). 
If the contractor has not reserved enough of a fund 
in his own hands to pay for the materials provided him 
by the appellant, then the respondent bank, by not re-
quiring a bond under the Statute, incurs the risk of 
having to pay over again for these items. 
''Because of the common purpose of these lien 
and contractors' bond statutes, and their practi-
cally identical language, adjudications as to what 
is lienable under the former are helpful in de-
termining the proper application of the latter. ' ' 
King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 
13 Utah 2d 339, 341, 374 P. 2d 254 (1962). 
This Court, in the case of King Brothers, Inc. v 
l""fah Dry Kiln Cornpany, supra, stated: 
''In order to qualify under these statutes it is nec-
essary that there be an annexation to the land, or 
to some permanent structure upon it, so that the 
materials in question can properly be regarded as 
having become a part of the realty; or a fixture 
9 
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appurtenant to it~ and this mnst haYP been doih\ 
\vith the intention of making it a permane11t part 
thereof. That the addition is consistent "~ith 
the use to \vhich the property is pnt is often help-
ful in making the determination.'' Ibid at :~-1-~. 
Other courts have perhaps laid greater stress on the 
requirement of adaption or appropriation to the use of 
the building, as has been stated by Tiffany: 
''A consideration on \\~hich the cases usually lay 
great stress, in determining the character of the 
article as a fixture Ye I non, is its character, as re-
lated to the uses to \vhieh the land has been appro-
priated, it being regarded as a fixture only in caRr 
there is a correspondence bet\veen its character, 
and consequently its prospective use, and the use 
to \vhich the land is devoted.'' Tiffany, Real Prop-
ert~~, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 610, p. 371. 
In the instant case, \Ye haYc the fabrication ancl 
manufacture of railings and gates to the order of the 
respondent lessee; these said railings and gates "rere 
affixed to the floor and "~ails of said structure : under 
the terms of the Lease Agreement, it \\~as the intention 
of the respondent and lessee that these railings and 
gates be the permanent part of said structure until such 
time as the lease expired and the lessee decided to re-
move same from the building. The addition of the rail-
ings and the gates \vas consistent \\·ith the use to \vhich 
the property \vas put. The ~\gTl'Pment and the intention 
to remoYe \Yas an agreement between the lessor and the 
lessee, and the appellant in this case had no kno\vledge 
or understanding, or information \vi th reference to the 
10 
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agrct-mPnt het\vet-n the I(·~sor and the ]p~see to ren1oYe 
t hPsP ~aid ra i 1 ings and gates. 
In other 'vords, the appellant 'vas n third party 
and not a party to the agreement bet\veen the respondent 
nnd the landlord. Therefore, since there is no pri,·ity, 
the ag-reement is not binding upon the appellant. This 
point is \VPll stated by the Supreme Court of California: 
"It is well stated, however, that such a contract, 
\vhether express or implied, is not effective against 
those not bound by the agreement; for example, 
innocent third persons. In such cases the intent 
that is material is that reasonably manifested by 
out\\~ard appearances.'' Trabue Pittman Corp., 
Limited v. Los Angeles County, 29 Cal. 2d 385, 
175 P. 2d 512, 529 (1946). 
1\lthough there is no arbitrary standard to be ap-
plied, the appellant in the case at hand was a. third party 
not bound by the agreement. The plaintiff, through rep-
resentations made to it by the non-paying contractor, 
\Yas led to believe the railings and gates were to be 
used in a bank in Idaho, and, therefore, had no notice, 
actual or constructive, of the lease agreement. 
'' ... <\part from statute, it is usually held or stated, 
as a general rule, that, although the parties may, 
as between themselves, agree that chattels to be 
annexed to realty shall remain personalty or be 
subject to a right of removal ... such agreements 
cannot ordinarily affect the rights of innocent 
third persons 'Yithout notice thereof .... " C.J.S., 
Sec. 17, pp. 638-639. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized the ne-
eessity of notice bet"·een the parties to the agreement 
11 
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and the third party, i.e., the appellant in the case at 
hand. 
''Where a structure is placed upon the laud of 
another with an agreement before attachment that 
it is to be, and remain, personal property, and not 
to become a part of the realty, and that it may he 
removed by the builder, the authorities are in 
unison to the effect that such an agreement will 
prevail as against a subsequent purchaser or mort-
gagee of the realty who has notice, actual or con-
structive, of the agreement." Workman Y. Hen-
rie, 71 Utah 400, 406, 266 P. 1033 (1928). 
In accord with the leading cases on the subject, the 
intention of the annexer to make a permanent addition 
to the land is of paramount importance. See Tea.fl v. 
Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am. Dec. 634 (1853) ; 1Vork-
1nan v. Henrie, supra. 
However, the controlling intent is the apparent in-
tent of the parties outwardly manifested to the appel-
lant, the apparent intent being the annexation of the 
railings and gates as an improvement to land. 
''Of course, it is true ... that generally the intent 
of the parties is a controlling criterion in ascer-
taining 'vhether property is permanently attached 
to the land or retains its identity as personalty. 
This applies between the immediate parties to a 
transaction, such as mortgagor and mortgagee, 
Yendor, and vendee, etc., and their successors in 
interst. But 'vhere, as here, the rights of a person 
unconnected 'Yith that transaction are concerned, 
and 'vho is without actual or constructive notice 
concerning the intent of the parties responsible for 
annexing the personalty to the land, the question 
is not so much the intent of the parties as the ap-
12 
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pa rPnt intent ns it 'vould reasonably appear to 
surh third perRons." IIammond T~umber Co. Y. 
Gordon, 84 Cal. App. 701, 258 P. 612, 614 (1927). 
Ev{\n if the railings and gates "~ere considered as 
trnde fixtures and, therefore, removable without the 
inserted elause in the lease, the argument is relevant 
only as to the lessor and lessee. See H ammon.d Lu,mber 
Co. v. Gordon., supra. 
CONCLUSION 
In considering the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the appellant (King Brothers, Inc., v. Utah Dry 
Kiln Co., supra), it is as clear as the sun on a cloudless 
day that the railings and gates were fabricated and con-
structed especially to the order of the respondent and 
affixed to the building which the respondent was leasing 
for the purpose of operating its said bank. To hold 
that the Utah Bond Statute does not apply in this in-
stance would be to hold that any addition to, alteration, 
construction, or improvement to land which was affixed 
as a matter of fact, but which could be unfixed by the 
removal of screws and bolts, or nails, would serve to 
defeat the application of the Statute which we urge 
should apply in this instance. The factual situation sur-
rounding the case points out emphatically that the na-
ture of the railings and gates was that of an addition 
to, alteration, construction, or improvement to land, 
i. e., special construction tends to show that the railings 
and gates were intended to constitute a part of the land 
and building; desirability as a part of the architectural 
13 
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design or finish of the building indicates the railings 
and gates are a part of the building; the fact that the 
railings and gates are removable "~ithout matPrial injur~· 
to the freehold does not defeat the nature of the items as 
a fixture; the appellant \\Tas a third party and not a 
party to the transaction bet,veen the lessor and lesSPP 
and, therefore, the agreement is not binding upon thP 
appellant. 
Because the purpose of the Statute is to protect 
those ''Tho performed labor and furnished the mat(·rials 
incorporated into the building, counsel for the appellant 
urges this Court to reverse the decision of the court 
belo'v and a\vard to the appellant the damages as prayed 
in its Complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAThi & PRATT 
By ALLAN E. MECHAM 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake Cit~r, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
14 
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